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Abstract: This study seeks to empirically determine to what extent continual
protest by regionalist parties may generate revenue for their regions. To this
end, we perform an econometric estimation using the collaboration agree-
ments between Spanish governments and the autonomous communities as the
dependent variable (first-level political and administrative divisions, CCAA
in their Spanish initials). We test our hypothesis by analogously applying the
economic specifications employed in studies of “pork barrel politics”, in-
cluding control variables regarding per capita income, regional financing sys-
tems, political variables such as support for regional governments from the
same political party or the existence of pivot parties. The results support the
theoretical conclusions reached by Treisman (1999), namely that non-sov-
ereignist regionalism generates revenue while sovereignist nationalism or re-
gionalism leads governments to react by applying unfavourable treatment.
Similarly, the fact that a regionalist party plays a key role in the investiture
of the national president brings with it even greater revenue to the region in
question, concurring with the results predicted by Brancati (2008).
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T he present study seeks to compensate for the absence of research which em-pirically quantifies the possible revenue to emerge from the asymmetricaltreatment that central governments may give to areas in which regionalist par-ties are present in an effort to stabilise the federal system1.In recent decades, within research into federalism, studying the stability of fed-
eral systems has become increasingly relevant. Federal political systems are a balance
(the degree of decentralisation indicated by Riker, 1964) between a centripetal force
of the accumulation of power in the centre which guarantees the provision of national
public goods and avoids secession and a centrifugal force which aims to shift power
(1) In international economic and political literature it is common to use the term regionalist to de-
note territorially established political movements which defend self-government. In Spain, two dis-
tinct terms are used: “nationalist”, the ultimate objective of which is usually its ideology, confeder-
ation or secession; and “regionalist”, whose aspiration to self-government is more limited and does
not amount to the confederal or secessionist limit.
towards the periphery in order to channel the political ambitions of territorial self-gov-
ernment. The degree of decentralisation, and therefore the point of equilibrium towards
which the territorial distribution of power tends at each moment, depends on struc-
tural factors such as the level of democratisation, linguistic, ethnic or religious di-
versity, income, population, the size of the country or the political structures prior to
independence [Panizza (1999); Arzaghi and Henderson (2005)]. Yet it also depends
on the relationship between central and regional governments and on the political
strategies adopted by each government and the political forces which support them.
Regionalist political movements are institutions specialised in capturing votes
through territorial conflict in order to come to power in their region and thereby be
able to exercise effective quotas of political power. To counteract the instability
caused by their protests, and above all the threats of secession in particular cases, cen-
tral governments may employ an array of strategies, such as increasing the general
decentralisation of the political structure, increasing decentralisation asymmetrically
by granting wider self-government to those regions which spark the greatest conflicts,
treating regions asymmetrically in the distribution of resources in an effort to satisfy
asymmetry in their demands, etc. The two former strategies are based on the notion
that increased decentralisation has as a “direct effect” vis-à-vis reducing regionalist
conflicts and secessionism since it satisfies demands for self-government. In turn, the
third path mentioned is based on the assumption that protests can be silenced with
money, such that the central government can stabilise the system by ensuring the in-
habitants of certain regions or their governments receive greater revenue than others
based on the asymmetrical political demands they make. There are numerous theo-
retical studies of this latter political alternative, with those by Treisman (1999) and
De Figueiredo and Weingast (2005) being the most important for our objective, since
they are the direct source of our work. Both conclude that, under specific conditions,
asymmetry in the distribution of revenue may be an appropriate strategy to achieve
equilibrium in the federal system when faced with strong regionalist movements.
Numerous empirical works are devoted to exploring these political processes,
although they are descriptive rather than quantitative, such that there are no studies
quantifying the effects of asymmetrical treatment and which determine the revenue
obtained by the inhabitants or governments of areas in which regionalist movements
are active. This explains the objective of the present study as set out at the beginning.
To achieve this, and given the absence of precedents, we turn by analogy to the
approach used in research which explores the existence of so-called “pork barrel pol-
itics”, and which tests the favourable treatment given by federal governments, in the
form of greater expenditure on transfers, towards more indecisive electoral districts
or those in which federal governments have greater support.
In the current study, we examine the case of Spain through a panel data analy-
sis for the 17 autonomous communities (henceforth - CCAA) for the period 1988-
2009, using the collaboration agreements signed by the central government with the
governments of the CCAA as the dependent variable and which are not tied to any
objective rules of endowment and distribution. Rather, it is the discretion of the state
which determines their distribution. In an attempt to evaluate the effects of region-
alism in the distribution of resources through agreements, we create diverse scenarios:
in scenario 1, as a representative variable of regionalist territories we introduce a
dummy which segregates CCAA where the regionalist party has governed the au-
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tonomous community during the bulk of the period considered, whether alone or in
coalition (the Basque Country, Catalonia. Aragon, the Canary Islands, Cantabria and
Navarre); in scenario 2, we introduce two dummies, one representative of CCAA that
have been governed by parties with confederal or secessionist aspirations, which in
Spain we call “nationalist” parties (the Basque Country and Catalonia), and another
representative of the remaining non-sovereignist regionalist governments (Aragon,
the Canary Islands, Cantabria and Navarre). Finally, in scenario 3, we introduce two
additional dummies to test the effect of “integrated regionalism” in the large national
parties; that is to say the possible influence of powerful leaders within national par-
ties which in turn govern CCAA. Specifically, these are the cases of the presidency
of Manuel Chaves (PSOE) in Andalusia and Manuel Fraga (PP) in Galicia.
Results show that the theoretical predictions of Treisman (1999) are fulfilled,
in such a way that non-sovereignist regionalism obtains considerable revenue, while
nationalism is “punished”, meaning that non-sovereignist regional protest appears
to represent the most productive strategy for securing resources through agreements.
In the case of integrated regionalism, this does not lead to any favourable treatment
of those CCAA which exercise it. Indeed, results show an unfavourable treatment
in the period of the presidency of Manuel Chaves in Andalusia, a paradigmatic ex-
ample of integrated regionalism in this autonomous community. Finally, it can be
concluded that the potential impact of regionalism is amplified by the fact that a re-
gionalist party becomes a pivot; that is to say, it enjoys representation in the national
parliament and wields decisive power in the investiture of the president of the gov-
ernment. This result concurs with the proposal of Brancati (2008).
In short, this research represents a novelty in three fields of study: in the field
of the theories of “pork barrel politics”, as there are no studies in this field examin-
ing the effect of regionalism as such in the territorial distribution of resources by cen-
tral administration; in the area of the assumptions of reaction by Hirschman (1970),
because it attempts to econometrically quantify the special benefits or revenues de-
rived from protesting and, consequently, to economically value one of Hirschman’s
alternatives; and finally, in the field of studying empirical models regarding the sta-
bility of federal systems, as we move from descriptive empiricism to the econometric
testing of the asymmetrical treatment hypothesis. Furthermore, in this latter aspect,
we contribute the novelty of analysing three possible strategies of regionalism: na-
tionalist, non-sovereignist and regionalism integrated within nationalist parties,
which allows us to test Treisman’s (1999) theoretical results.
The study is organised as follows. The next section provides a review of the pre-
ceding literature. In the third, we define the econometric specification used and de-
scribe the data sources employed. In the fourth section, we offer the results to emerge.
To conclude, the fifth section discusses the results and provides a brief summary of
our conclusions.
1. LITERATURE REVIEW
Following Hirschman’s reaction model (1970), regionalist political movements
can be defined as institutions which seek to capture votes via protest and the threat of
exit [Masseti and Schakel (2013)]. In decentralised systems, these political movements
have the opportunity to win elections in regional legislatures and thereby exercise ef-
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fective quotas of political power [Chhibber and Kollman (1998) and (2004); Sorens
(2008) or Brancati (2008)]. If, in addition, regionalist parties are able to obtain repre-
sentation in the central chambers, their capacity for political impact is enhanced, in-
creasing the likelihood of them exploiting the conflict with the federal government or
with the federation itself as a means of pressuring to obtain a greater capacity for self-
government, which favours the instability of the federal system [Brancati (2008)].
To counteract the instability caused by protests and threats of secession, central gov-
ernments usually act in three ways: increasing decentralisation in a general way, sym-
metrically; increasing it specifically or asymmetrically in favour of those who protest,
and dealing asymmetrically with the various regions when distributing resources.
With regard to the first strategy, it has often been conjectured in political prac-
tice that increasing decentralisation has a “direct effect”, namely a reduction in re-
gionalist conflicts and secessionism [Lijphart (1975); Stepan (2001); Murshed,
Tadjoeddin and Chowdhury (2009); Gromes (2010); Brinkerhoff (2011)].
However, as stated by Erk and Anderson (2009) and Vaillancourt, Roy-Cesar and
Bird (2010), whether or not this hypothesis is supported is a question that is yet to be
solved scientifically. Certain studies, such as those by Curtice (2006) and Roeder
(2009), conclude that decentralisation does not reduce secessionist demands. Another
empirical line of research, which includes the work of Jenne, Saideman and Lowe
(2007), posits that decentralisation encourages secession, either because it makes cit-
izens believe that secession is a more realistic possibility or because it favours se-
cessionism by giving minority groups access to the centres of regional power.
Indeed, if decentralisation increases the political weight of regionalist parties, these
in turn may encourage conflicts and secessionism [Snyder (2000); Eaton (2006)]. Put
differently, decentralisation would produce an “indirect effect”, consisting of the de-
nationalisation of the political system (parties losing clout at the central level). Within
this notion are found the statistical analyses of Brancati (2008) and Harbers (2010),
although on the basis of an empirical study of 71 countries Lublin (2012) argues that
the indirect effect is curbed if the institutional design increases regional autonomy
but fails to allow regionalist party access to central power.
Sorens (2008) proposes a more complex vision and one in line with our study, dis-
tinguishing between two different strategies for territorial minorities: secessionism and
regionalism. While secessionists demand the right to free determination, regionalists
seek limited autonomy within the central state. If voters are rational, secessionist par-
ties will be stronger in regions which can benefit economically and politically from in-
dependence, and regionalist parties will be stronger in regions which would benefit
from autonomy but not from independence. Sorens concludes that decentralisation in-
creases the votes obtained by regionalist parties, but that these do not evolve towards
secessionism but rather concentrate on broadening their proposal to other regions and/or
reducing tax flows to the regions with fewest resources. In the same line, the work by
Lago and Lago (2011) finds no relationship between decentralisation and dena-
tionalisation of the political system for Western European countries.
One alternative which can be used by central government to stabilise the sys-
tem is to increase the degree of decentralisation asymmetrically, which Tarlton
(1965) terms “asymmetrical federalism”. Congleton (2006) suggests the economic
and political reasons for the emergence of asymmetrical federalism. According to
this author, the real degree of political decentralisation is determined by political
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agreements, within and between national and regional entities, in such a way that dif-
ferences in the interests and negotiating power of regional entities will affect the dis-
tribution of political power in a decentralised state. In turn, Wehner (2000) maintains
that the asymmetrical configuration of a federation structure may respond to motives
of macroeconomic efficiency, administrative cohesion, or the incapacity of certain
subcentral governments to effectively exercise all their powers. However, it may also
be due to political reasons, such as reducing territorial tensions and ensuring the sta-
bility of the political system. Kymlicka (1998) and Burgess (2006) hold that asym-
metry is a central government reaction to the different political pressure exerted by
each area and, in extreme cases, may be the strategy to maintain the very unity of
the country. Numerous studies into this question have been carried out. Prominent
among the most important and recent theoretical works are: Kyriacou, Bacaria and
Congleton (2003), who analyse the political foundations for the asymmetrical dis-
tribution of authority in a federal state and in international organisations; the work
of Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova (2004), who examine the process of negoti-
ation when forming a federal system and its subsequent functioning; the theoretical
model of Hombrado (2011), who employs a game which includes the remaining re-
gions as a discordant third party, and who may form a bloc in reaction to the asym-
metrical model; or that of Zuber (2011), who concludes that asymmetric federalism
is, by its very nature, unstable given that it is a three-way relationship between the
central government, privileged regions in the asymmetric distribution, and the rest.
Asymmetrical federalism is not necessarily apparent solely in the form of the
power structure; it is also possible to employ asymmetrical distribution of resources
as a stabilising mechanism of the state. Treisman (1999) analyses theoretically the
possibility of using intergovernmental resources to “appease” the protest of regions
who make the greatest demands for self-government. To this end, he proposes a game
theory model in which the central government has a utility function related positively
to the total revenue obtained from the regions and negatively to the rejection of its
authority. Opposing it, there are two subcentral governments which can obtain mo -
re votes if in exchange for supporting the central government they secure more re-
sources with which to increase their public services. Alternatively, subcentral gov-
ernments can also receive electoral support if they oppose the central government.
For this to occur, however, the electorate needs to be predisposed towards this type
of approach as a result of tense historical relations between central and regional gov-
ernment, cultural or ethnic factors, and the organised presence of centralist and sep-
aratist groups in the region. In this electoral environment, regional leaders can ex-
ploit the potential mobilisation which protest allows in order to generate
confrontation and attract new voters who reinforce the support they already have [Tar-
row (1991); Vaillancourt (1992); Przeworski (1995)].
In Treisman’s model, the result depends on central government preference for
controlling resources and reducing conflicts, on voter sensitivity towards the in-
creased offer of public goods and services, and on their aversion to centralist poli-
cies. In principle, in the absence of regionalist radicalism, the optimum strategy for
central government is asymmetrical treatment; that is to say, redistribution in favour
of the most regionalist region. However, if voter aversion to the central government
runs high, it is preferable for the central government to employ punishment through
monetary penalisation.
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This conclusion of asymmetrical treatment in the distribution of resources is also
shared by the theoretical model of Figueiredo and Weingast (2005). According to these
authors, the heterogeneity of the exit costs function for each region implies that the
compensation obtained by remaining in the federation differs. Thus, central govern-
ment activity based on “price discrimination”, which can be translated into a differ-
ence in the distribution of revenue, may be a strategy to generate system equilibrium.
Empirical treatment of the asymmetrical response to the pressure of regionalist po-
litical movements, not only in the power structure but also in the distribution of resources,
is well documented in various descriptive studies. The existence of asymmetries can be
observed in contexts as different as Germany [Benz (1999)], Canada [Swenden (2002)],
Belgium [Bayenet and De Bruycker (2006)], India [Rao and Singh (2007)], Russia
[Martinez-Vazquez (1999)], Spain [Agranoff (1999), Werner (2009)], South Africa,
and the United Kingdom [Watts (1999), McGarry (2005)]2. Nevertheless, it must be
emphasised that although descriptive studies allow us to identify asymmetry in power
structures, no effort has been made to attempt to quantify the revenue obtained by
the inhabitants or governments of the areas where regionalist movements exist. Ac-
cordingly, we propose the objective of the present study, which we now address.
2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Given the lack of empirical studies aimed at quantitatively estimating asym-
metrical treatment in the distribution of resources due to the effect of regionalism,
we recur by analogy to the empirical methodology of research which tests the
favourable treatment of certain electoral districts for political motives, or so-called
“pork barrel politics”.
The two classical models which study public expenditure decisions on the ba-
sis of political and/or electoral profitability are the contributions by Lindbeck and
Weibull (1987) and Cox and McCubbins (1986). In both of these studies, politicians
seek to remain in power, and spending policies among the different electoral districts
are decided with this aim in mind. The principal prediction of Lindbeck and Weibull
(1987) is that public funds will be directed towards undecided districts; that is to say
those with a high percentage of voters who are prone to change their vote on the ba-
sis of their financial situation. This type of region is characterised by the fact that
the representatives of the party in power obtained a narrow margin of differential
votes. By contrast, Cox and McCubbins (1986) consider that politicians are risk aver -
se. Consequently, public funds are directed towards regions where a sizeable majority
has been obtained, since such investment is safe.
At the empirical level, certain studies show that spending is allocated to areas
where the difference in votes was smaller [Dahlberg and Johansson (2002); Castells
and Solé-Ollé (2005)], whereas others point to rewarding “loyal” districts through
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(2) See the compilation studies of Bird (2007), Weller and Nobbs (2011), the comparative work of
Hooghe, Marks and Schakel (2010) and that of Snyder (2000), which describes different processes
of decentralisation and concludes that experience demonstrates that it is cheaper for regionalists to
negotiate regional and cultural agreements, autonomy and the redistribution of some funds than to fo-
ment continued insurgence.
expenditure [Joanis (2011)]. Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) feel that these am-
biguous results may, in part, be due to the method employed or to the fact that the
two hypotheses may be fulfilled simultaneously. Furthermore, as Stromberg (2008)
indicates, distribution of funds is conditioned by the electoral system, and thus more
funds are awarded to regions in which the vote is undecided but also pivotal; that is
to say, it is essential to decide who will win the elections.
More closely aligned with our objective, Crain and Oakley (1995), Cadot, Röller
and Stephan (2006), Kemmerling and Stephan (2002) and Golden and Picci (2008) find
evidence that political factors influenced the focus of regional expenditure in the USA,
France, Germany and Italy, respectively. In the case of Spain, the studies by Castells
and Solé-Ollé (2005), Solé-Ollé (2013) and Agnani and Aray (2012) estimate an equa-
tion of investment decisions in infrastructure among the autonomous communities. In
the three studies, the conclusion is that the political profitability of investing influences
the distribution made by the central government. In De la Calle and Orriols (2010), con-
cerning the investment to expand the Madrid metro system, the conclusion is that the
hypothesis of Cox and McCubbins (1986) is not validated, but that there does exist
weak support for the hypothesis of Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). The work of Hierro,
Atienza and Gómez-Álvarez (2014) and Simón, Lago and Vaquero (2014) refers to the
investment agreements with the CCAA. The first of these studies concludes that the
ideological affinity between the two levels of government and electoral motivations are
fundamental criteria for signing investment agreements. In turn, the second study con-
cludes that priority is given to CCAA in which regional elections are more competi-
tive, where the party in power at the national level obtains better electoral results in na-
tional elections and where there are more seats to be won.
In order to test whether asymmetrical treatment is used as a compensation mech-
anism for the demands of asymmetrical self-government when distributing re-
sources, as predicted by Treisman (1999) and De Figueiredo and Weingast (2005),
we use an econometric specification based on panel data and derived from the stud-
ies cited above. Payments for agreements between central government and the
CCAA are taken as the dependent variable, on which we seek to gauge the possible
effect of regionalist protest and the existence, or otherwise, of asymmetrical treat-
ment by central government towards the various regions, such treatment being de-
rived from said regionalist protest.
However, before advancing further we must reflect upon the term regionalist.
In Spain, the concept of regionalism does not correspond to what is traditionally at-
tributed to the term in the economic field. While general research employs the term
regionalism to include pro-sovereignist and non-sovereignist territorial political
movements, two terms are commonly used in Spain. On the one hand, the term na-
tionalist is used to refer to parties with sovereignist objectives of secession or con-
federation, while on the other hand the term regionalist is used for those who aspire
to maximise self-government within the common state3. In other words, in Spain we
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(3) The Royal Academy of Spanish Language defines nationalism as: “The ideology of a people who,
affirming their condition as a nation, aspire to constitute themselves as a state”; and regionalism as:
“the political tendency or doctrine according to which, when governing and forming the organisation
of a state, special attention must be paid to the way of being and to the aspirations of each region”.
find ourselves with the more complex vision proposed by Sorens (2008), which re-
quires positing differences with regard to protest strategies and to the possible ef-
fect of secessionist objectives, but which will also allow us to evaluate more precisely
the different reactions set out by Treisman (1999).
In addition to these differences, in certain regions, regionalism in Spain has been
exercised from within nationwide parties. Put differently, regionalism has been
channelled not through the creation of a regionalist party but by exercising internal
power in a nationwide party. This would be somewhat similar to the third actor in
the game proposed by Hombrado (2011), but proposed not as a coalition of non-re-
gionalists but rather as an internal power within a nationwide party.
Faced with these singularities, we propose incorporating three alternative sce-
narios into our study: one in which all the areas with regionalist parties are consid-
ered as a whole; a second scenario which distinguishes between regions with na-
tionalist parties and those with non-sovereignist parties, and finally, a third scenario
which takes account of the fact that in certain regions, at certain times, major national
political figures, who could exercise integrated regionalism, are in government.
The three scenarios described are estimated through the following specifications:
Scenario 1:
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Scenario 3:
The dependent variable we use (Lnagreemenstsi,t) is the contributions made by
the central government through cooperation agreements signed with the CCAA.
These are published in the Official State Gazette (Boletín Oficial del Estado, BOE)
and normally involve co-financing by the autonomous community in question.
They are mostly directed towards co-funding investment expenditure and are justi-
fied by the existence of a certain concurrence of competencies. The main feature
which makes them ideally suited as the variable in our study is that the agreements
are signed at the discretion of the central government on the basis of bilateral and
opaque negotiations with each autonomous community. That is to say, the distribu-
tion of resources is not subject to any explicit, objective and formulated distribution
criterion, but is decided subjectively and discretionally by central government4. The
(4) In fact, in the standard regional financing system, unconditioned transfers are all non-discretionary
since they have a formulated distribution aimed at sufficiency, covering the spending needs of the CCAA
[see Hierro (1996) or Monasterio and Suárez (1998) for the financing system until the 1997-2001 model
variable is expressed in euros per inhabitant at constant 1988 prices for the 17 CCAA
and the 22 years considered (from 1988 to 2009) (in a Napierian logarithm). The data
source is: “Informes Económico-Financieros de las Administraciones Territori-
ales”, published annually until 2009 by the Ministry of Public Administrations5.
With regard to the data source, it should be clarified that there have traditionally
been two data sources concerning regional financing: the one just cited, which for the
variable under consideration obtains its figures from the agreements published in the
BOE, and that taken from the “Informes sobre la Financiación de las Comunidades
Autónomas y Ciudades Autónomas” from the Ministry of Finance, known as “Au-
tonomous Financing in Figures” since 2002, for which the source is the Intervención
General de la Administración del Estado, (IGAE), which we take to be liquidated data
like the rest in the report. This dual origin means that data are different.
The merger of the two ministries (Finance and Public Administrations) in 2011
led to the report published by Public Administrations being discontinued and the se-
ries being truncated. As regards the other series, which comes from the surviving re-
port, data are found in two sources: the Economic Database of the Spanish Public Sec-
tor6 and the reports of the “Haciendas Autonómicas en Cifras”. The first source offers
data on investment agreements until 2001 and the second from 2002 to 2013. The prob-
lem is that between 2002 and 2005 the data on agreements ceased to be published in
isolation and, in their place, data were offered from a series which included state sub-
sidies managed by the CCAA, the agreements and the programme contracts. That is
to say, this second series was also truncated, although in this case in intermediate years.
Given this problem and owing to the need to opt for one series or another, we
chose to use the continuous series from Public Administrations and truncated from
2010 onwards. Otherwise, it would be necessary to apply a reconstruction method
for the unavailable intermediate data, which would always prove arbitrary. Further-
more, given that the years lost in the series correspond to those of the economic cri-
sis and the agreements are characterised by being a co-financed instrument, distri-
bution in recent years has been affected by deficit control policies and liquidity
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and Bassols, Bosch and Vilalta (2010) and De la Fuente (2009a, 2009b, 2009c) for the 2002-2008 mod-
els and the current one]. These spending requirements, estimated from a distribution formulated on the
basis of necessity indicators (where population is fundamental), are covered by the taxes ceded to the
state and by participation in national revenue (Participación en los Ingresos del Estado). In turn, cur-
rent conditional transfers are also not discretionary, since they are fundamentally aimed at fulfilling a
single objective, which is related to spending requirements for health and social services, power over
which was only decentralised, up until 2001, to five CCAA in the common system (those with a broad
ceiling of competencies) in addition to the two foral (special) CCAA. As regards capital transfers, all
are non-discretionary, with the exception of investment agreements and programme contracts. Indeed,
both the Interterritorial Compensation Fund (Fondo de Compensación Interterritorial, FCI) and Eu-
ropean structural funds are explicitly geared towards achieving the interterritorial re-equilibrium and
economic development of regions with the lowest per capita income. In the FCI, distribution is for-
mulated on the basis of indicators of said need for re-equilibrium. Eligibility criteria of structural funds
also respond to that objective [see Atienza, Hierro and Patiño (2008)].
(5) For 2007 to 2009, these data are available online at http://www.seap.minhap.es/web/areas/polit-
ica_autonomica/info_basica/2anaeco/iefaatt.html. For earlier years, publication is on paper.
(6) Economic database of the Spanish public sector, offered by the Institute of Fiscal Studies online
at http://www.estadief.meh.es/bancodedatos/finanauto.html
restrictions, which differed among the CCAA, meaning that the variable in those
years loses part of its virtues. In short, we felt it preferable to use the source which
offers continuous data between 1988 and 2009.
As for the independent variables, with regard to the regionalism variable which
is the fundamental object of interest in this study, we constructed three scenarios. In
scenario 1, we use a single dummy variable, Regionalismi, with a value of 1 in the
CCAA in which for most of the years in the period considered a regionalist party gov-
erned alone or in coalition (for the formation of government and/or investiture of the
president) (the Basque Country, Catalonia, Aragon, the Canary Islands, Cantabria and
Navarre), whether sovereignist or not.
In scenario 2, we distinguish two types of regionalism, with Nationalismi,t be-
ing a dummy with the value of 1 in those CCAA where, either alone or in coalition,
a sovereignist party governed, as is the case in Catalonia and the Basque Country
and Nonsovereigntisregionalismi,t for the remaining CCAA in which a non-sover-
eignist regionalist party normally governed (Aragon, the Canary Islands, Cantabria
and Navarre). The historical sequence of government in those CCAA is as follows7:
– Basque Country: throughout the period, the PNV governed in coalition with:
the PSE between 1988 and 1990, Euskadiko Esquerra (EE) in 1991, the PSE
and EE between 1992 and 1994, the PSE and Eusko Alkartasuna (EA) be-
tween 1995 and 1997, EA between 1998 and 2001, and EA and Ezker Batua
(EB) between 2002 and 2009.
– Catalonia: throughout the period, nationalist parties governed: CiU until 2003,
and from 2003 to 2009 the tripartite coalition formed by the PSC, Iniciativa
per Catalunya Verds (IC-V) and the nationalist Esquerra Republicana de
Catalunya (ERC).
– Canary Islands: Canary Islands regionalist parties also governed in all the
years, either in coalition with other regional parties or alone. From 1988 to
1991 Agrupaciones Independientes de Canarias (AIC), together with the
CDS; from 1991 to 1993, AIC together with the PSOE; from 1994 to 1995
a coalition of three regionalist parties, AIC, Centro Canario Independiente
(CCI) and Iniciativa Canaria Nacionalista (ICAN); and from 1996 to 2009,
Coalición Canaria always governed (grouping together the parties men-
tioned above) together with the PP.
– Aragon: except between 1993 and 1995, when the PSOE governed, in the re-
maining years of the period considered the Partido Aragonés Regionalista (PAR)
governed alone (1988-1989), in coalition with the PP (1990 to 1993 and 1995 to
1999) and participating in government with the PSOE (from 1999 to 2009).
– Cantabria: between 1988 and 1990 the PP governed alone and, following a
turbulent period in 1990, in 1991 a coalition of the Partido Regionalista de
Cantabria (PRC) transitorily governed together with the PP, PSOE and CDS.
Between 1991 and 1994, Unión para el Progreso de Cantabria (UPC) gov-
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(7) For the coalition agreements, we have used the data offered by the Observatory of Coalition Gov-
ernments in Spain (Observatorio de los Gobiernos de Coalición en España) of the University of Bar -
celona, http://www.ub.edu/OGC/index_es_archivos/Acuerdos.htm.
erned in coalition with the PP, and from then on the PRC entered into gov-
ernment with the PP until 2003 and governed with the PSOE for the remai -
ning years of the study.
– Navarre: although between 1988 and 1991 the Partido Socialista Navarro
(PSN) governed alone, after that regionalist parties governed alone or in coali-
tion. From 1991 until 1995, the Unión del Pueblo Navarro (UPN) governed
alone; in 1995-1996 there was a coalition government agreement involving
the PSN, Convergencia de Demócratas de Navarra (CDN) and Eusko Alka-
rtasuna (EA); from 1997 to 2003 the UPN governed alone and, from 2003
onwards the UPN governed in coalition with the CDN.
In scenario 3, we add the variables Integratedregionalism(Chaves)i,t and Inte-
gratedregionalism (Fraga)i,t, which capture the influence of national leaders such as
Manuel Chaves in the case of the PSOE, President of Andalusia from 1990 to
2009, for practically the whole period considered, and in the case of the PP, Manuel
Fraga, President of Galicia from 1990 to 2005.
The control variables respond to political and non-political considerations.
Those of a political nature are based on the idea that political factors affect the dis-
tribution of resources by central governments in the direction predicted by the the-
ory of pork barrel politics, as stated. Consequently, we have included Pivotei,t, a
dummy variable with a value of 1 for those CCAA and during the years of the leg-
islature in which two conditions are met: a regionalist party, in the broad sense of
the term, voting in favour of investing the president of the government when he or
she did not hold an overall majority, and when the regionalist party which supported
the investiture governed alone or in coalition in the C.A. (autonomous community)8.
Both conditions were fulfilled in the following cases: in the investiture of Fe-
lipe González on 9 July 1993, when the parliamentary group of the PSOE obtained
159 seats (a parliamentary majority requires 176 seats), and votes in favour were
given by CiU and PNV, parties which governed in their respective CCAA; in the ap-
pointment of Aznar on 4 May 1996, when the parliamentary group of the PP obtained
156 seats and received support from CiU, the PNV and Coalición Canaria, whose
parties governed their respective CCAA; and finally, in the investiture of José Luis
Zapatero on 16 April 2004, when the PSOE obtained 164 seats and required the
favourable vote of the BNG, ERC and Coalición Canaria, thereby fulfilling the sec-
ond condition, that they governed in their CCAA in coalition.
A second political hypothesis of this type which we include concerns whether
the ideological concurrence between the two levels of government, that is to say when
the parties governing the nation and the CCAA are the same, has resulted in favou -
rable treatment towards such CCAA. This effect is represented by two dummies,
PSOEPSOEi,t and PPPPi,t, which take the value 1 when the same party occupies the
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(8) Including this variable is unusual in empirical estimations. However, it can be found in Solé-Ollé
(2013). Artés and Bustos (2008) analyse the gains obtained by CiU with regard to the extent to which
the electoral promises made for supporting the investiture of Felipe González in 1993 and José María
Aznar in 1996 were fulfilled. It was clear that CiU becoming the pivotal party for the investiture of
the central government proved beneficial for that party, in that there was notable compliance with their
electoral promises.
national government and the regional government, regardless of whether the latter
is governed alone or in coalition9.
The non-political control variables have two justifications: on the one hand, they
clarify the economic logic behind the distribution of resources due to cooperation
agreements10. Rao (2000) calculates the income elasticity of transfers, regressing
them with per capita GDP (in Napierian logarithms) in order to gauge the imbalance
in the distribution of resources among the various regions11. Following Rao (2000),
we include per capita GDP in constant euros (in logarithm) (LNGDPpci,t).
Moreover, given that the CCAA receive resources from the Fondo de Com-
pensación Interterritorial (FCI) and from Structural Funds in order to achieve in-
terterritorial rebalancing, there is the possibility that the territorial allocation of re-
sources from cooperation agreements maintains a relationship of substitution or
complementarity with the FCI and European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).
In other words, discretionality in distribution might follow the pattern of comple-
menting the funds obtained in this way by the CCAA or, by contrast, might serve
to compensate those CCAA which do not receive FCI and ERDF funds by provid-
ing them with other substitute transfers. For this reason, we include the set of FCI
and ERDF transfers received by each of the CCAA among the control variables in
constant euros per capita (in logarithm) (LNFCIFEDERi,t).
This latter reason is why the final control variable, the Forali,t dummy, is included.
As there are two systems of financing, the common and the foral12, which differ enor-
mously in their design and since the foral provides autonomous communities with per
capita funding far in excess of the common system13, it is logical that these discre-
tionary transfers made via agreements, which are an additional resource, should be
used at a minimum level (the essential sums of the resources of the agreements) in
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(9) When empirically testing the theory of pork barrel politics, it is common to introduce an ideo-
logical concurrence variable between the two levels of government. Some examples include Bungey,
Grossman and Kenyon (1991), Worthington and Dollery (1998), Khemani (2007), Arulampalam et
al. (2009), Solé-Ollé and Sorribas (2008), Gonçalves and Veiga (2013) or Gonçalves and Pinho (2007).
(10) The literature on fiscal federalism includes studies such as those by Martínez and Boex (1999),
Brodjonegoro and Martínez (2002), Hofman and Cordeira (2004), De la Fuente and Gundín (2008)
or Hierro, Atienza and Patiño (2010), which quantify the distributive effects of intergovernmental trans-
fers, using statistical dispersion or even concentration index indicators.
(11) In Hofman and Cordeira (2004) and Hierro, Atienza and Patiño (2010), regressions are performed,
firstly, between per capita tax resources and per capita GDP (in logarithms) and, secondly, between
total per capita resources (aggregating transfers to tax resources) and per capita GDP, in order to test
how the income elasticity of resources varies due to the inclusion of transfers.
(12) The foral regime basically consists of a pact between the state and these CCAA, through which
the latter enjoy broad fiscal autonomy in the matter of national taxes, both in the regulatory capacity
of taxes within general national fiscal regulations and in their management and collection. In exchange,
these CCAA must transfer to the state a sum to finance the spending the state makes in their region.
Consequently, it is a very different model to that of the common regime [see Zubiri (2007), Monas-
terio (2010) or De la Fuente (2011)].
(13) Thus, with reference to 2011 and to the total financing per inhabitant derived from the resources
of the regional funding system, the Basque Country obtained 4,969 euros and Navarre 4,141.7, while
the average of the remaining CCAA was 2,285.5 euros. Data were obtained from the Ministry of Fi-
nance and Administrations “Regional Treasuries in Figures”, www.minhap.gob.es/es-ES/Areas%
20Tematicas/Financiacion%20Autonomica/Paginas/haciendas%202005.aspx.
the case of the foral CCAA. That is to say, it is reasonable for there to be a discrim-
inatory treatment in a negative sense for the Basque Country and Navarre14.
The data source of the FCI and ERDF is the Ministry of Economy and Finance
(1986 to 2001) and the Ministry of Finance and Public Administrations (various years
(b)). Regional GDP was obtained from the Regional Accounting of the Spanish Sta-
tistical Office (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE)15. In order to deflate to 1988
euros, we took the interannual variation rates of the general consumer price index
according to the information from the INE16.
Finally, the βt are annual dummy variables included in the specification to con-
trol for the temporary shocks which affect all the CCAA simultaneously, thereby pre-
venting them from being absorbed by our dummy variables which are the subject
matter, and thus distorting the results.
3. RESULTS
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the 374 observations included in the
econometric model of panel data. It should be clarified that for the non-dichotomous
variables, those corresponding to values in level, not in logarithm, are presented.
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(14) See Hierro, Atienza and Gómez-Álvarez (2014).
(15) http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxis&path=%2Ft35%2Fp010&file=inebase&.
(16) http://www.ine.es/ss/Satellite?L=0&c=Page&cid=1254735893337&p=1254735893337&page
name=ProductosYServicios%2FPYSLayout.
Table 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE VARIABLES
Standard
Variables Mean deviation Min. Max.
Dependent Agreements 16,0814 21,2258 0,0040 143,9521
variables Regionalism 0,3529 0,4785 0 1
Nationalism 0,1176 0,3226 0 1
Explanatory Non sovereignist regionalism 0,2353 0,4247 0 1
variables Integrated Regionalism (Chaves) 0,0535 0,2253 0 1
Integrated Regionalism (Fraga) 0,0428 0,2026 0 1
Controls Pivotal 0,0775 0,2678 0 1
PSOEPSOE 0,3529 0,4785 0 1
PPPP 0,2219 0,4161 0 1
GDPpc 8.794,255 2.211,692 4.265,161 14.492,61
FCIFEDER 28,3347 24,8803 0,0004 117,4073
Foral 0,1765 0,3226 0 1
Source: Own elaboration.
Note: In the non-dichotomous variables (Agreements, GDPpc and FCIFEDER) the statistics of the
series are presented in levels (euros per inhabitant to constant euros of 1988) and not in logarithms.
All the estimations evidenced problems of heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation
and contemporary correlation. Autocorrelation was detected by applying the
Wooldridge test (2002) for autocorrelation of panel data, while contemporary cor-
relation was revealed by applying the Pesaran test (2004). An attempt was made to
resolve these problems by applying generalised least squares. Moreover, we confirm
that the panels of the non-dichotomous variables are stationary by applying the Levin,
Lin and Chu (2002), Im, Pesaran and Shin tests (2003), the Lagrange multiplier test
of Hadri (2000), the Harris and Tzavalis test and Fisher-type tests, using an Aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips and Perron (PP) test, proposed by
Maddala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001). For this reason, it was not necessary to
perform an analysis of co-integration among the variables.
Table 2 presents the results of the three scenarios explained.
The results of the explanatory variables which are the subject of interest in this
study show that if we integrate the two types of regionalism, sovereignist and non-
sovereignist, in a single variable (Regionalism), this proves statistically significant
and results in greater additional revenue (scenario 1). In turn, if we disaggregate the
two types of regionalism, the existence of non-sovereignist regionalism in a CA can
be seen to produce favourable asymmetrical treatment (between 73% and 74%,
accor ding to scenarios 2 and 3, respectively), while sovereignist regionalism (Na-
tionalism) entails penalisation towards the CCAA in which this is present (50-51%
below the average). On the other hand, regionalism integrated in national political
parties is only statistically significant in the case of the presidency of Manuel Cha -
ves in Andalusia, but with a result contrary to that expected, since it entailed 31%
fewer resources for his CA than the national average.
In turn, among the remaining political factors considered, it can be affirmed that
CCAA with regionalist parties benefited from having played a key role in certain
terms of office with regard to ensuring the investiture of the national president; that
is to say, due to their condition of pivots, although the variable is only statistically
significant for scenarios 2 and 3. Similarly, we can observe that, for the period con-
sidered, ideological concurrence between the two levels of government signifi-
cantly influenced the distribution of discretionary resources, but with one difference.
In the case of concurrence with PSOE governments, the CCAA involved received
between 29% and 46% above the average according to the scenario considered, while
concurrence with PP governments meant the respective CCAA received between
21% and 26% fewer resources in this way.
Results also show that all the non-political control variables are significant, such
that: resources followed a regressive distribution; that is to say, they benefited more
those CCAA with a greater per capita GDP; a complementarity effect existed be-
tween the distribution of collaboration agreements and FCI and ERDF; and that the
foral CCAA (the Basque Country and Navarre), received between 92% and 95% less
from these resources than the average of the CCAA.
Finally, it can be observed that the coefficients of the annual dummies are all
statistically significant, except for 1996. Thus, only in 1994 and 1995 are the coef-
ficients negative, which means that only in these years did the CCAA receive on av-
erage fewer resources through cooperation agreements than the year which serves
as the basis for the estimation, in other words, 1988. In the remaining years, more
resources were received on average than in the base year.
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Table 2: EXPLANATORY VARIABLES OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF DISCRETIONARY
TRANSFERS VIA COLLABORATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
AND THE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES. 1988-2009
Variables Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Regionalism 0,3553***
(0,0583)
Nationalism -0,6991*** -0,7245***
(0,0748) (0,0789)
Non sovereignist regionalism 0,5460*** 0,5543***
(0,0689) (0,0784)
Integrated Regionalism (Chaves) -0,3651***
(0,0750)
Integrated Regionalism (Fraga) 0,1837
(0,1316)
Pivotal 0,0060 0,3651*** 0,3682***
(0,0837) (0,0828) (0,0855)
PSOEPSOE 0,2512*** 0,3390*** 0,3799***
(0,0530) (0,0483) (0,0490)
PPPP 0,0226 -0,2325*** -0,2974***
(0,0618) (0,0676) (0,0729)
LNGDPpc 0,4760** 0,9422*** 0,9372***
(0,2049) (0,1999) (0,2063)
LNFCIFEDER 0,0975*** 0,1017*** 0,1050***
(0,0236) (0,0239) (0,0246)
FORAL -2,6549*** -2,3632*** -2,3410***
(0,2079) (0,2183) (0,2243)
CONSTANT -3,2569* -7,3531*** -7,3440***
(1,8430) (1,7984) (1,8590)
YEAR 1989 0,1508*** 0,1098*** 0,1071***
(0,0251) (0,0242) (0,0242)
YEAR 1990 0,2649*** 0,2030*** 0,2115***
(0,0281) (0,0266) (0,0325)
YEAR 1991 0,4243*** 0,3404*** 0,3475***
(0,0287) (0,0271) (0,0330)
YEAR 1992 0,1571*** 0,0611** 0,0755**
(0,0290) (0,0279) (0,0341)
YEAR 1993 0,3397*** 0,2357*** 0,2422***
(0,0339) (0,0325) (0,0381)
YEAR 1994 -0,1509*** -0,2736*** -0,2655***
(0,0315) (0,0319) (0,0387)
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Table 2: EXPLANATORY VARIABLES OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF DISCRETIONARY
TRANSFERS VIA COLLABORATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
AND THE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES. 1988-2009 (continuation)
Variables Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
YEAR 1995 -0,3425*** -0,4710*** -0,4656***
(0,0428) (0,0421) (0,0486)
YEAR 1996 0,0204 0,0885 0,1629**
(0,0589) (0,0571) (0,0649)
YEAR 1997 0,3076*** 0,3777*** 0,4597***
(0,0621) (0,0594) (0,0680)
YEAR 1998 1,0542*** 1,0878*** 1,1662***
(0,0677) (0,0663) (0,0742)
YEAR 1999 0,9161*** 0,9459*** 1,0284***
(0,0663) (0,0629) (0,0720)
YEAR 2000 1,0969*** 1,1088*** 1,1822***
(0,0657) (0,0629) (0,0705)
YEAR 2001 0,9819*** 0,9883*** 1,0567***
(0,0809) (0,0798) (0,0864)
YEAR 2002 0,6249*** 0,6093*** 0,6824***
(0,0836) (0,0819) (0,0888)
YEAR 2003 1,2726*** 1,2631*** 1,3289***
(0,0861) (0,0845) (0,0914)
YEAR 2004 0,9114*** 0,6634*** 0,6821***
(0,0877) (0,0879) (0,0950)
YEAR 2005 1,3136*** 1,0574*** 1,0763***
(0,0921) (0,0920) (0,0994)
YEAR 2006 1,7915*** 1,5086*** 1,5427***
(0,0809) (0,0820) (0,0859)
YEAR 2007 1,9482*** 1,6463*** 1,6784***
(0,0898) (0,0900) (0,0940)
YEAR 2008 2,2122*** 1,9868*** 2,0151***
(0,0901) (0,0884) (0,0916)
YEAR 2009 2,1923*** 1,9899*** 2,0187***
(0,0803) (0,0785) (0,0813)
Wald χ2 70.735,71 78.582,30 81.585,30
P-value 0,0000 0,000 0,0000
Source: Own elaboration.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, ***: significance to 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Note: Base year in the estimation of annual dummies: 1988.
4. DISCUSSION
Firstly, the results from scenario 1 make it clear that, overall, regional protest gen-
erated additional profitability for the CCAA in question in the sense that the central
government appears to have used asymmetrical treatment as a pacifying mechanism.
In other words, persistent demand for more self-government led the central government
to disburse asymmetrical treatment, as predicted in previous theoretical studies.
However, when we distinguish between regions which have nationalist parties
and those with regionalist non-sovereignist formations, a clear difference emerges,
since now, in the case of the nationalism variable, the coefficient has a negative value,
while for the non-sovereignist regionalism variable it takes a positive value. This oc-
curs in the two scenarios considered. This behaviour allows us to empirically
demonstrate the theoretical forecasts of Treisman (1999). Indeed, as Treisman pre-
dicts, the absence of radicalism, that is to say what we term non-sovereignist re-
gionalism, favours asymmetrical treatment by the central government in favour of
the region where that non-sovereignist regionalism is located, whereas more radi-
cal nationalism which stirs antipathy towards the central government, suffers mon-
etarily as a result. From this result, one can deduce a kind of gradualism vis-à-vis
the extent to which regionalism proves profitable, such that electoral support for re-
gionalist ideas is beneficial for regions in financial terms, provided that such re-
gionalist ideas do not become sovereignist or advocate secession. However, when
taken too far and when they cross the line and arouse voter aversion towards the state
and, by extension, the central government, the latter reacts by sanctioning the region
in order to prevent destabilisation of the system.
In turn, if we relate the result obtained by the non-sovereignist regionalism vari-
able to the Pork Barrel variables, it could be inferred that this kind of regionalism
proved even more profitable than political concurrence between central and regional
government, since when such concurrence appears with a PSOE central government,
favourable treatment is much lower than that obtained by regionalism. When the cen-
tral government is PP, regions with governments of the same hue even end up los-
ing resources (between 21% and 26%).
Another interesting aspect to consider concerns the coefficients estimated for
the pivot variable. When we consider regionalism as a whole (scenario 1), the vari-
able is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, when we separate non-sovereignist
regionalism from nationalism, it proves significant in the sense that it increases the
resources with regard to the national average in CCAA where a regionalist party
proved decisive in the investiture of the national government president. This result
coincides with the proposal of Brancati (2008), namely that the potential impact of
regionalism is amplified with representation in the central chambers and the subse-
quent decisive power when investing the national government president.
With regard to what we term integrated regionalism, and which we represent
through two variables for the regional governments of two national political “heavy-
weights”, such as Manuel Chaves (PSOE) and Manuel Fraga (PP), as can be ob-
served, the presence of these figures at the head of their CCAA did not result in a sig-
nificant positive coefficient. Thus, it cannot be concluded that their influence proved
instrumental in the agreements. Indeed, in the case of Manuel Chaves’s term as pres-
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ident, fewer resources than the national average were obtained. Needless to say, when
their party is in government, these figures can influence government action through
other more important channels such as statutory reforms or reforms of the financing
system, transfer of powers, etc. They could also exert this regionalist influence by
proposing the appointment of ministers and high-ranking posts who could in turn
make their influence felt through other channels. In other words, this particular as-
pect requires further study, which lies outside the scope of our objective.
From these latter considerations it follows that, given that this study offers an
initial approach to the empirical exploration of possible revenue from regionalism,
it opens up possibilities for a new line of research. In the same way as we have em-
pirically obtained an estimation of revenue for regionalist protest in terms of coop-
eration agreements for the period considered, we could calculate the effects of
other financial relationships between CCAA and government as well as other ex-
penditure and revenue items contained in the central administration budget in order
to ascertain the overall size of the revenue obtained. This is important because, as
agreements constitute a secondary aspect of the financial relationships between the
two levels of government, the revenue obtained through this channel might be off-
set or increased by other concepts, thereby altering the direction of our conclusions.
In sum, we understand that the present study opens up future research strands
which have only previously been explored theoretically, and which might be ad-
dressed empirically following the framework proposed here.
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RESUMEN
El objetivo de este trabajo es determinar empíricamente en qué medida el
ejercicio de la protesta continua por parte de los partidos regionalistas
puede producir rentas para sus territorios. Para ello realizamos una estima-
ción econométrica utilizando como variable dependiente los convenios de
colaboración entre el Gobierno de España y las Comunidades Autónomas.
Testa mos nuestra hipótesis aplicando por analogía las especificaciones
econométricas utilizadas en los trabajos sobre Pork Barrel Politics, inclu-
yendo variables de control referidas a nivel de renta por habitante, los re-
gímenes de financiación autonómica, variables de tipo político como el
apoyo a gobiernos autonómicos del mismo partido político o la existencia
de partidos pivote. Los resultados corroboran las conclusiones teóricas de
Treisman (1999) de que el regionalismo no soberanista genera rentas mien-
tras que el nacionalismo o regionalismo soberanista provoca como reacción
un trato desfavorable por parte del Gobierno. Asimismo, el hecho de que
un partido regionalista sea decisivo en la investidura del Presidente del Go-
bierno conlleva incluso mayores rentas al territorio en cuestión, lo cual coin-
cide con los resultados previstos por Brancati (2008).
Palabras clave: regionalismo, federalismo asimétrico, Hirschman, pork
barrel.
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